I am going to run a short series on Darwinian concepts that I believe are most important to my philosophy. I am applying mechanical principles that Darwin saw amongst species to idea-streams (discussed in the previous post under the notes of #1). Although I have work to do, my hypothesis is that these mechanical principles can be applied to ideas because the causes for the mechanisms amongst species has to do with the form of specimen creation and survival, and not the content of the living organism. This form of specimen creation and survival is, I hypothesize, present in the conditions of a turbulent, thinking mind (with some conditions).
The following section is from Chapter 2 of On the Origin of Species, titled “Variation Under Nature”. I believe it to be one of the most underrated and most important conceptual revisions in appreciating and understanding Darwin’s mechanism. This morning, my aim is to transcribe the section, and when I have time later, I will make some commentary on it:
“Certainly no clear line of demarcation has as yet been drawn between species and sub-species–that is, the forms which in the opinion of some naturalists come very near to, but do not quite arrive at the rank of species; or, again, between sub-species and well-marked varieties, or between lesser varieties and individual differences. These differences blend into each other in an insensible series; and a series impresses the mind with the idea of an actual passage.
Hence I look at individual differences, though of small interest to the systematist, as of high importance for us, as being the first step towards such slight varieties as are barely thought worth recording in works on natural history. And I look at varieties which are in any degree more distinct and permanent, as steps leading to more strongly marked and more permanent varieties; and at these latter, as leading to sub-species, and to species. The passage from one stage of difference to another and higher stage may be, in some cases, due merely to the long-continued action of different physical conditions in two different regions; but I have not much faith in this view; and I attribute the passage of a variety, from a state in which it differs very slightly from its parent to one in which it differs more, to the action of natural selection in accumulating (as will hereafter be more fully explained) differences of structure in certain definite directions. Hence I believe a well-marked variety may be justly called an incipient species; but whether this belief be justifiable must be judged of by the general weight of the several facts and views given throughout this work.
…(paragraph on population skipped)
From these remarks it will be seen that I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences, is also applied arbitrarily, and for mere convenience’s sake.”
Natural Causes 